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Empirical Research Paper
Impressions of others are often influenced by the social cat-
egories to which they belong (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Freeman & Ambady, 2011). This tendency to categorize peo-
ple is a robust and spontaneous process that occurs early in 
person perception (Ito & Urland, 2003; Stangor, Lynch, 
Duan, & Glas, 1992). Because social categories have associ-
ated stereotypes, when a person is categorized, they also are 
more likely to be judged according to group stereotypes 
(Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). More generally, 
factors that increase social categorization also increase ste-
reotyping (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Kunda & Spencer, 2003).
Although social categorization and stereotyping are 
clearly related, there has been relatively little direct investi-
gation of the specific processes by which categorization 
impacts stereotyping. In the present research, we are particu-
larly interested in the roles of stereotype activation (SAC) 
and stereotype application (SAP) in this relationship. 
Whereas SAC describes an increase in the accessibility of a 
stereotype in memory, SAP refers to the use of an activated 
stereotype in judgment (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). 
Theoretically, increased categorization might yield increased 
stereotyping by increasing SAC, SAP, or both.
Based on prior research, one might conclude that catego-
rization should primarily influence SAC. This is because 
much of the work addressing this question has relied on 
priming tasks that were thought to reflect only the extent of 
SAC and to not be influenced by SAP (e.g., Devine, 1989; 
Devine & Monteith, 1999; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wheeler 
& Fiske, 2005). However, it has since become clear that 
these kinds of priming tasks do not offer a process-pure win-
dow into knowledge activation. Rather, they also reflect a 
variety of processes that determine the extent to which acti-
vated knowledge influences performance (e.g., Payne, 2001; 
Sherman et al., 2008). Most critically, no research has exam-
ined the simultaneous influence of social categorization on 
independent estimates of SAC and SAP that are derived from 
performance on the same task. This is necessary to ensure 
that any observed differences in the extent of SAC and SAP 
are not confounded with measurement. That is, if different 
tasks are used to measure distinct processes, then any out-
comes may be due to the demands of the tasks, rather than to 
differences in the processes of interest (e.g., outcomes differ 
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because of “structural fit”; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). 
Thus, the extent to which categorization impacts stereotyp-
ing via SAC versus SAP remains an open question.
Determining the mechanisms underlying the relationship 
between categorization and stereotyping is both theoretically 
and practically important. Depending on the mechanism, the 
conditions under which stereotyping is more or less likely 
and the interventions that may be expected to reduce stereo-
typing will differ. For example, SAC is often considered to 
be a less controllable process than SAP (Devine, 1989; Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). Thus, understanding 
whether categorization increases stereotyping due to changes 
in a relatively more controllable (SAP) or less controllable 
(SAC) process has implications for understanding how ste-
reotyping may be reduced. In particular, if categorization 
increases stereotyping through changes in application, inter-
ventions may be able to reduce stereotyping by affecting pro-
cesses that occur after stereotypes have been activated. Thus, 
it may not be necessary to change underlying stereotypes as 
long as the expression of those stereotypes can be reduced. 
However, if categorization primarily influences SAC, inter-
ventions will need to focus on reducing the strength of the 
associations between categories and stereotypes (i.e., inter-
ventions will need to target underlying representations). In 
addition, better understanding the underlying mechanisms in 
the relationship between categorization and stereotyping 
improves our ability to design interventions that target the 
most relevant processes.
Overview of the Current Research
To examine how categorization impacts stereotyping pro-
cesses, we utilized the stereotype misperception task (SMT; 
Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). The SMT is ideal for inves-
tigating this question because data from the SMT can be sub-
jected to a multinomial processing model that provides 
independent estimates of SAC and SAP. Models such as the 
SMT are advantageous for understanding process as they can 
measure the extent to which multiple processes contribute to 
a single outcome, rather than using separate tasks to measure 
different processes. Prior work has used separate tasks to 
measure the extents of activation and application. The poten-
tial problem with this approach is that it opens the possibility 
that observed differences in the processes may be due to task 
variance rather than to differences between activation and 
application, per se. In the SMT model, SAC assesses the 
extent to which stereotypes are activated, whereas SAP rep-
resents the likelihood that activated stereotypes are applied 
in judgment. The SMT also estimates a detection parameter 
(D) that represents the likelihood that a target will be accu-
rately judged or individuated, and a guessing parameter (G)
that measures general response bias. A more detailed descrip-
tion of the model can be found in the “Method” section.
To manipulate the extent of categorization, we varied the 
salience of social categories. Because categories and 
stereotypes are closely linked, factors that make categories 
more distinct or salient also lead to more stereotyping. One 
factor known to influence category salience is group compo-
sition (Abrams, Thomas, & Hogg, 1990). For example, mul-
tiple studies have found that groups with a homogeneous 
social category composition (e.g., a group of all Black or all 
White individuals) are categorized and stereotyped to a lesser 
degree than groups with a heterogeneous composition (e.g., 
a group of both Black and White individuals) because variety 
highlights differences among a set (Abrams et al., 1990; 
Macrae & Cloutier, 2009; Oakes & Turner, 1986).
In the present research, to manipulate category salience, 
we employ a variant of the “priming context” manipulation 
used in Macrae and Cloutier (2009). To create a low salience 
context, we “block” the primes by race. In this condition, 
participants only see Black or White faces, which has been 
shown to reduce the extent of category activation (Macrae & 
Cloutier, 2009). To create a high salience context, we “mix” 
the racial category of the primes. In this condition, partici-
pants randomly see Black and White faces, which increase 
the extent of category activation (Macrae & Cloutier, 2009).
In Experiment 1, we compare stereotyping in blocked 
versus mixed contexts, as well as the extents of SAC and 
SAP in the different contexts. In Experiment 2, we test 
whether category salience influences the effect of category 
prototypicality on stereotyping. We use Experiment 2 to 
demonstrate that the SMT model is sensitive to changes in 
category salience. Finally, in Experiment 3, we further exam-
ine the relationships among category salience and stereotyp-
ing processes by decreasing salience. We compare SAC and 
SAP in conditions in which categories are never made salient 
to high category salience conditions.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants.1 In Experiment 1, 149 undergraduates at a uni-
versity in California participated. Our sample size was pow-
ered at 95% using the smallest effect size (ηp 22
2 = . ) for the 
prime main effect reported in Krieglmeyer and Sherman 
(2012). Following outlier exclusion procedures from the 
original SMT protocol, two participants were removed from 
the analysis for pressing the same key on every trial. All par-
ticipants were given partial course credit as compensation. 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis to quantify the level of 
power afforded by the final sample of 147 participants. A 
sensitivity analysis for a two-tailed paired t test at 80% 
power, α = .05 indicated that we would be able to detect an 
effect size of dz = .233 or larger.
Materials. Prime stimuli included pictures of faces of 24 
White and 24 Black young men on a gray background taken 
from Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012). Neutral primes were 
24 gray face-like shapes.2
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Target stimuli were 48 ambiguous male face drawings, 
which were made from pictures developed by Oosterhof and 
Todorov (2008) to vary in objective level of threat. Half of 
the target faces were two standard deviations above a neutral 
level of threat, whereas the other half was 2 standard devia-
tions below neutral threat. These faces were converted into 
blurred face drawings to make the extent of threat more dif-
ficult to detect (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012).
Procedure
SMT. Participants completed the experiment individu-
allly on computers in groups of 1 to 4 people. The SMT is 
framed as an impression formation task. On a given trial, par-
ticipants are presented with a Black, White, or neutral prime, 
which is followed by a target face. Participants are instructed 
to judge whether target faces are more or less threatening 
than the average face presented on the task.
The current experiment followed the task procedure out-
lined in Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012). Each trial began 
with a fixation cross presented for 500 ms, followed by a 
prime presented for 150 ms, which was followed by a blank 
screen for 50 ms, and then a target for 100 ms. After the pre-
sentation of the target, a patterned back mask was presented 
and remained on the screen until participants made a judg-
ment about whether the target face was more or less threaten-
ing than the average target faces presented in the task. 
Judgments on the task were framed as relative rather than 
absolute in order to avoid floor or ceiling effects if partici-
pants feel that targets are all threatening or unthreatening 
(Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). Participants were told to 
pay attention to the prime faces but to not allow them to 
affect their judgments. Therefore, any influence of the primes 
on judgments of the targets would be unintentional. A 500 ms 
intertrial interval separated trials. To acclimate participants 
to the task, participants completed two sets of practice 
blocks. In the first practice block, participants made threat 
judgments for six trials in which only target faces were pre-
sented. In the second practice block, participants made threat 
judgments for six trials in which both primes and targets 
were presented. All prime and target types were included in 
the practice blocks. Typically, following the practice trials, 
participants complete two sets of 72 test trials on the SMT. In 
the current experiment, due to the priming context manipula-
tion, participants completed five sets of 80 test trials. The 
typical finding on the SMT is a prime main effect showing 
that Black primes lead to a greater proportion of “more 
threatening” judgments of targets than White primes (see 
Figure 1). 
Manipulation of categorization. To manipulate categoriza-
tion, we employed a variant of a category salience manipu-
lation used in Macrae and Cloutier (2009). Specifically, 
primes were presented in a way that made categories either 
higher or lower in salience. On half of the trials, participants 
made judgments in a “mixed” context, in which prime race 
randomly varied. Variation in the prime race makes the cat-
egories salient. In contrast, on the other half of trials, judg-
ments were made in a “blocked” context, in which only one 
prime race was presented in each block. The lack of change 
in prime race makes racial categories less salient. Priming 
context was manipulated within-subjects, in counterbalanced 
blocks. There were 200 trials in which primes were presented 
in a blocked context. The other 200 trials were presented in a 
mixed context (see Figure 2).
Figure 1. Visual representation of the SMT procedure.
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task.
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Design. The experiment used a 2 (context order: blocked first 
vs. mixed first) × 2 (priming context: blocked vs. mixed 
context) × 2 (prime: Black vs. White) × 2 (target: high vs. 
low threat) mixed design. All factors were within-subjects, 
with the exception of the counterbalanced priming context 
order.
Results
SMT effect. To examine whether priming context moderated 
stereotyping, we subjected the proportion of “more threaten-
ing” responses to a 2 (priming context order: blocked context 
first vs. mixed context first) × 2 (priming context: blocked 
vs. mixed) × 3 (prime: Black vs. neutral vs. White) × 2 (tar-
get: high vs. low threat) mixed-analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).3 There was a main effect of target, F(1, 145) = 
28.56, p < .001, ηp
2 165= . , such that high threat targets 
were given a greater proportion of threat judgments than low 
threat targets. There also was a prime main effect, F(2, 290) 
= 32.24, p < .001, ηp
2 182= .  (see Table 1). Simple 
comparisons showed that targets were judged as more threat-
ening following Black primes than White primes, F(1, 145) 
= 31.44, p < .001, ηp
2 177= . , 95% confidence interval of 
the difference (CIdiff) = [.10, .20], and neutral primes, F(1, 
145) = 55.88, p < .001, ηp 277
2 = . , 95% CIdiff = [.16, .27]. 
In addition, White primes led to a greater proportion of threat 
judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 146) = 6.28, p = .013, 
ηp
2 041= . , 95% CIdiff = [.01, .12].
Of primary interest, if priming context affected stereotyp-
ing, we expected to observe a priming context × prime inter-
action, indicating that stereotyping was reduced in the 
blocked context compared with the mixed context. We found 
the anticipated priming context × prime interaction, F(2, 
290) = 6.82, p = .001, ηp
2 045= . , which indicated that the 
prime main effect in the blocked context was weaker, F(2, 
292) = 22.73, p < .001, ηp
2 135= . , than the prime effect in 
the mixed context, F(2, 292) = 35.56, p < .001, ηp
2 196= .  
(see Figure 3 for mean proportions). In the blocked context, 
Black primes led to a greater proportion of threat judgments 
than White primes, F(1, 146) = 18.54, p < .001, ηp
2 113= . , 
Figure 2. Visual representation of the priming context manipulation conditions.
Table 1. Proportion Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) as a Function of Priming Context, Prime, and Target.
Experiment 1
 Priming context
 Blocked Mixed
 Black Neutral White Black Neutral White
High threat .51 (.02) .34 (.02) .41 (.02) .54 (.02) .33 (.02) .36 (.02)
Low threat .47 (.02) .26 (.02) .35 (.02) .51 (.03) .24 (.02) .33 (.02)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Targets listed vertically in column.
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95% CIdiff = [.06, .17]. However, this prime effect was 
stronger in the mixed context, F(1, 146) = 37.30, p < .001, 
ηp 203
2 = . , 95% CIdiff = [.12, .24]. Overall, these results 
indicate that priming context moderated stereotyping, such 
that the blocked (vs. mixed) context reduced the tendency to 
judge targets as more threatening after Black primes, com-
pared with White primes.
Modeling overview. To examine the cognitive mechanisms 
that underpin the effect of priming context, we applied the 
SMT multinomial processing tree model. The SMT model 
estimates four parameters, each representing a latent cogni-
tive process: SAC, SAP, detection (D), and guessing ten-
dency (G). The processing model is designed to describe 
how these four processes interact to produce responses on 
the task. A racial prime can activate a stereotype with the 
probability of (SAC) or fail to activate stereotypes with the 
probability (1-SAC). If a stereotype is activated, it will be 
applied in judgment with the probability of (SAP) or not 
applied with probability of (1-SAP). When a stereotype is 
activated and applied in judgment, participants will give a 
stereotype consistent response (e.g., selecting the “more 
threatening” response following a Black prime). In contrast, 
if a stereotype is activated but not applied, a stereotype 
inconsistent response will be given (e.g., selecting “less 
threatening” following a Black prime). If a stereotype is not 
activated, participants can correctly detect (D) the target 
threat level (e.g., selecting the “more threatening” response 
when the target is high in threat). If the threat level is not 
detected (1-D), participants will either guess “more threaten-
ing” with the probability of (G) or “less threatening” with a 
probability of (1-G).
Parameters from the SMT model are estimated from the 
observed frequencies of responding “more” or “less” threat-
ening, depending on the prime and target combination. These 
responses are entered into equations that make up a process-
ing tree. Each branch represents a combination of processes 
that occur with a certain probability, and that result in a 
particular response given the prime and target type. The 
probability for each branch is based on the product of all the 
probabilities of the processes in the branch (see Figure 4 for 
the structure of the modeling tree).
To illustrate, consider a trial in which a prime is Black and 
the threat of the target is low. A “more threatening” judgment 
may come from stereotype activation and stereotype applica-
tion (SAC * SAP). Alternatively, a more threatening judg-
ment could come from guessing “more threat,” when the 
stereotype is not active and the target threat is not correctly 
detected ([1-SAC] * [1-D] * G). Therefore, if a Black prime 
and a low threat target are presented on the same trial, the 
probability of a high threat judgment is ([SAC * SAP] + 
[1-SAC] * [1-D] * G).
The parameter values are generated using maximum like-
lihood estimation. Maximum likelihood iterates until the 
model’s expected frequencies most closely match the 
observed data. Parameter values range from 0 to 1 and repre-
sent the probability that the process is contributing to the 
observed data. We used the freely available computer pack-
age MultiTree (Moshagen, 2010), which reports model fit 
using the G2 statistic and a p value. If the model approxi-
mates the observed data well, the G2 value should be small, 
and the p value should be large. Model fit can also be used to 
compare groups for significant differences in a given param-
eter estimates. For example, to test whether priming context 
influences SAC, we would set the SAC parameter for the 
blocked context to be equal to the SAC parameter for the 
mixed context. Any significant change in model fit (G2) 
would suggest that the manipulation affected SAC.
Modeling results. First, we aggregated the sums of the “more 
threatening” and “less threatening” responses based on each 
of the SMT trial types for both the blocked and mixed 
Figure 3. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
priming context and prime in Experiment 1.
Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Table 2. Model Fits Comparing Several MPT Models.
MDL AIC BIC
Experiment 1
 SMT 23,082.10 46,117.73 46,185.55
 d-SMT 23,090.18 46,135.84 46,203.66
 PDg 23,336.59 46,635.47 46,686.34
Experiment 2
 SMT 21,220.36 42,394.76 42,462.08
 d-SMT 21,236.09 42,428.18 42,495.50
 PDg 21,612.24 43,187.17 43,237.66
Experiment 3
 SMT 34,182.61 68,316.05 68,386.99
 d-SMT 34,214.07 68,380.93 68,451.86
 PDg 34,627.83 69,215.93 69,269.13
Note. Lower numbers denote less model misfit. MPT = multinomial 
processing tree. Fit critera: MDL = minimum description length; AIC 
= Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
Model acronyms: SMT = stereotype misperception; d-SMT = detection-
first SMT, PDg = process dissociation with guessing parameter.
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contexts. The model misfit was minimal, G2(4) = 4.82, p = 
.306. We also estimated the effect size of the extent of model 
misfit with the w statistic, which controls for power. The 
effect size of model misfit was small, w = .011.
To examine the processes by which priming context influ-
enced stereotyping on the SMT, we fit the model to the 
blocked and mixed contexts. We first fit a baseline model 
that had no parameter restrictions (i.e., parameters were 
allowed to vary freely). Then, to test for differences between 
groups, we constrained each parameter one at a time across 
groups. A significant loss in fit from the baseline model sug-
gests that the parameter estimates differ reliably across prim-
ing contexts.
First, we investigated whether the SAC parameter dif-
fered across priming context. There was no difference 
between the blocked (SAC = .66; 95% confidence interval 
(CI) = [.61, .71]) and mixed contexts (SAC = .69; 95% CI 
= [.65, .74]) in level of SAC, ΔG2(1) = .86, p = .354, w = 
.005 . Next, we compared the SAP estimates for the two con-
texts. SAP was lower in the blocked (SAP = .58; 95% CI = 
[.57, .60]) than in the mixed context, ΔG2(1) = 19.45, p < 
.001, w = .023 (SAP = .63; 95% CI = [.62, .65]; see 
Table 3 for parameter estimates; see Table 4 for model fit by 
Experiment).
There was an unanticipated difference between the two 
contexts in G parameter estimates, ΔG2(1) = 4.92, p = .03, 
w = .012, indicating that G was higher in the blocked than 
the mixed context (see Figure 2). This shows that partici-
pants were more likely to guess “more threat” in the blocked 
condition. This effect does not replicate in subsequent exper-
Figure 4. Structure of the SMT multinomial processing tree.
Note. The top part shows the model for Black and White primes, and the bottom part shows the model for neutral primes. The table on the right depicts 
the responses as a function of prime and target. The response “more threat” is represented by a “+” sign, and the response “less threat” is represented 
by a “–” sign. SMT = stereotype misperception task; SAC = stereotype activation; 1-SAC = lack of stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; 
1-SAP = stereotype correction; D = detection of target threat; 1-D = detection of target trait; G = tendency to guess “more threat”; 1-G = tendency 
to guess “less threat.”
Table 3. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% CIs] by 
Priming Context.
Experiment 1
 Blocked Mixed
SAC .66 [.62, .71] .70 [.65, .74]
SAP .58 [.57, .60] .63 [.62, .65]
D .09 [.07, .11] .09 [.07, .12]
G .29 [.27, .30] .26 [.25, .28]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; CI = confidence interval; 
SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; D = target 
detection; G = guessing.
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iments and cannot account for the greater degree of stereo-
typing in the mixed condition.5
Discussion
In Experiment 1, there was more stereotyping in the mixed 
condition than the blocked condition, indicating that cate-
gory salience increased stereotyping. The SMT model 
revealed that this effect of priming context on stereotyping 
was associated with changes in SAP. Specifically, the level 
of SAP was higher in the mixed than in the blocked priming 
context. Somewhat unexpectedly, priming context had no 
notable impact on SAC. These findings indicate that varia-
tion in category salience mainly affected the extent to which 
activated stereotypes were applied.
Because our SAC modeling findings were unexpected, 
given the current literature, we conducted Experiment 2 as a 
replication and extension of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 
used an identical design to Experiment 1, but added an addi-
tional factor of Black prime prototypicality. Prior research 
found that high prototypic Black primes tend to elicit more 
SAC than low prototypic Black primes (Krieglmeyer & 
Sherman, 2012). By manipulating Black prime prototypical-
ity, we are able to further establish that the SMT is sensitive 
to changes in SAC and that the findings of Experiment 1 are 
not due to a lack of measurement sensitivity. Furthermore, 
little research has been conducted on how category salience 
might also impact within-category stereotyping, that is, the 
extent of stereotyping depending on category prototypicality. 
Experiment 2 allows us to examine how within-category ste-
reotyping might be influenced by category salience.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. In all, 140 undergraduates from a university in 
California participated in Experiment 2. One participant was 
removed from the analysis due to a data writing error. Once 
again, our sample size was powered at 95% using the small-
est effect size (ηp 22
2 = . ) for the prime main effect reported 
in Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012). Just as before, we con-
ducted a sensitivity analysis to quantify the level of power 
afforded by the final sample of 139 participants. A sensitiv-
ity analysis conducted for a two-tailed paired t test at 80% 
power, α = .05 indicated that we would be able to detect an 
effect size of dz = .240 or larger.
Materials and procedure. Similar to Experiment 1, prime 
stimuli were 24 White and Black male faces on a gray 
background, and neutral primes were gray face-like 
shapes. Novel to Experiment 2, we added an additional 
variable of Black prime prototypicality, using the stimuli 
and design employed in Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012, 
Experiment 4). The 24 Black primes were divided into 
two sets of 12 low prototypic and 12 high prototypic faces. 
The White faces and neutral primes also were randomly 
divided into high or low prototypic sets. As a result, the 
high and low prototypic sets of primes only vary with 
respect to Black prototypicality. Just as in Experiment 1, 
we manipulated category salience using priming context. 
The SMT procedure and number of trials were identical to 
Experiment 1.
Design. The Experiment used a 2 (context order: blocked 
first vs. mixed first) × 2 (priming context: blocked vs. mixed 
context) × 3 (prime: Black vs. neutral vs. White) × 2 (prime 
set: high vs. low prototypic) × 2 (target: high vs. low threat) 
mixed design. All factors were within-subjects, with the 
exception of counterbalanced priming context order.
Results
SMT effect. To examine the effect of priming context on ste-
reotyping, we subjected the proportion of “more threatening” 
judgments to a 2 (priming context order: blocked context 
first vs. mixed context first) × 2 (priming context: blocked 
vs. mixed context) × 3 (prime: Black vs. neutral vs. White) 
× 2 (prime set: high vs. low prototypic) × 2 (target: high vs. 
low threat) mixed-ANOVA. This analysis revealed a main 
effect of target, F(1, 137) = 33.20, p < .001, ηp
2 195= . , 
such that high threat targets were given a greater proportion 
of threat judgments than low threat targets (see Table 5 for 
Table 4. Model Fit Statistics.
Fit statistic
Study 1: context analysis
 MDL (FIA) 231.10
 cFIA 31.24
 AIC 46,117.73
 BIC 46,185.55
Study 2: context analysis
 MDL (FIA) 23,082.10
 cFIA 31.24
 AIC 46,117.73
 BIC 46,185.55
Study 2: prototypicality analysis
 MDL (FIA) 20,920.70
 cFIA 30.99
 AIC 41,795.42
 BIC 41,862.74
Study 3: context analysis
 MDL (FIA) 34,182.61
 cFIA 32.58
 AIC 68,316.05
 BIC 68,386.99
Note. MDL = minimum description length; FIA = Fisher information 
approximation; cFIA = complexity FIA; AIC = Akaike information 
criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
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mean proportions). There also was a main effect of prime, 
F(2, 274) = 63.66, p < .001, ηp
2 317= . , which simple 
effects revealed was due to Black primes leading to a greater 
proportion of threat judgments than White, F(1, 138) = 
45.59, p < .001, ηp 248
2 = . , 95% CIdiff = [.11, .21], and 
neutral primes, F(1, 138) = 112.46, p < .001, ηp
2 449= . , 
95% CIdiff = [.21, .31]. White primes also led to a greater 
proportion of threat judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 138) 
= 19.03, p < .001, ηp
2 121= . , 95% CIdiff = [.05, .14].
There also was a prime set main effect, F(1, 137) = 69.47, 
p < .001, ηp
2 336= . , that was qualified by an interaction 
with prime, F(2, 274) = 120.47, p < .001, ηp
2 468= . . Simple 
effects analyses indicated that high prototypic Black primes 
led to a greater proportion of threat judgments than low pro-
totypic Black primes, F(1, 138) = 201.24, p < .001, 
ηp
2 593= . , 95% CIdiff = [.20, .26]. The White primes also 
differed by set, F(1, 138) = 20.89, p < .001, ηp
2 131= . , 95% 
CIdiff = [.03, .06], indicating that White primes that were 
presented with the low Black prototypic set led to more 
threat judgments than White primes presented in the high 
prototypic set. Neutral primes were not treated differently 
based on prime set, F(1, 138) = .00, p = .989, ηp < 001
2 .  (see 
Table 6 for mean proportions).
If priming context moderated race-based stereotyping, 
this would reveal a priming context by prime interaction. 
Once again, we found the anticipated interaction, F(2, 274) 
= 6.10, p = .003, ηp
2 042= . , which indicated that the prime 
main effect in the blocked context was weaker, F(2, 276) = 
48.53, p < .001, ηp
2 260= . , than in the mixed context F(2, 
276) = 59.79, p < .001, ηp
2 302= .  (see Figure 5 for mean 
proportions). Simple effects analyses revealed that there was 
a smaller difference in threat judgments following Black ver-
sus White primes in the blocked context F(1, 138) = 29.70, 
p < .001, ηp
2 177= . , 95% CIdiff = [.09, .19], than there was 
in the mixed context, F(1, 138) = 50.71, p < .001, ηp
2 269= .
, 95% CIdiff = [.14, .25] (see Figure 6 for mean propor-
tions). There was no three-way interaction among context, 
prime, and prime set, F(2, 274) = .64, p = .529, ηp
2 005= . , 
indicating that category salience did not moderate the effect 
of prototypicality on stereotyping.
Modeling results. There were two primary findings in Experi-
ment 2: moderation of prime by priming context and an 
interaction between prime and prime set. To understand the 
Table 5. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) as a Function of Priming Context, Prime, and Target.
Experiment 2
 Blocked Mixed
 Black Neutral White Black Neutral White
High threat 0.51 (0.02) 0.29 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.57 (0.02) 0.32 (0.02) 0.36 (0.02)
Low threat 0.49 (0.02) 0.21 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 0.21 (0.02) 0.32 (0.02)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Targets listed vertically in column.
Table 6. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) 
as a Function of Prime and Prime Set.
Experiment 2
 Black Neutral White
High set 0.64 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 0.33 (0.02)
Low set 0.40 (0.02) 0.26 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Prime set listed vertically 
in column.
Figure 5. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
priming context and prime in Experiment 2.
Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Figure 6. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of prime 
and prime set in Experiment 2.
Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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processes underlying these results, we fit the data to two dif-
ferent models. In the first model, we examined the effect of 
priming context on stereotyping processes. Model misfit was 
minimal according to both measures of fit, G2(4) = 7.65, p = 
.105, w = .016. As in Experiment 1, we found no difference 
between the blocked (SAC = .72; 95% CI = [.67, .75]) and 
mixed contexts (SAC = .74; 95% CI = [.70, .77]) in level of 
SAC, ΔG2(1) = .51, p = .474, w = .004. However, the con-
texts did differ in the level of SAP, ΔG2(1) = 14.10, p < 
.001, w = .020, indicating that SAP was lower in the blocked 
(SAP = .60, 95% CI = [.58, .61]) than in the mixed context 
(SAP = .63; 95% CI = [.62, .64]), replicating the results 
from Experiment 1 (see Table 7 for parameter estimates).
The second model examined the effect that Black proto-
typicality had on stereotyping processes. Model fit differed 
significantly from zero on the G2 measure of misfit, G2(4) = 
14.322, p = .006. However, the w effect size statistic indi-
cated that the magnitude of misfit was small, w = .021. This 
analysis revealed a significant difference between the two 
prime sets in level of SAC, ΔG2(1) = 173.566, p < .001, w 
= .072, such that activation was greater in the high proto-
typic prime set (SAC = .91; 95% CI = [.88, .95]), than in the 
low prototypic prime set (SAC = .55; 95% CI = [.51, .59]), 
replicating previous findings (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 
2012). SAP was similarly affected by prototypicality, ΔG2(1) 
= 154.41, p < .001, w = .068, such that the extent of appli-
cation was greater for the high prototypic prime set, (SAP = 
.67; 95% CI = [.65, .68]) than the low prototypic prime set 
(SAP = .52; 95% CI = [.51, .54]; see Table 8 for parameter 
estimates).
Discussion
Results from Experiment 2 replicated and extended those 
from Experiment 1. We found that category salience moder-
ated stereotyping, such that high category salience led to 
more stereotyping than low category salience. As in 
Experiment 1, high (vs. low) category salience was associ-
ated with an increase in SAP, but not an increase in SAC. In 
addition, Black prototypicality moderated stereotyping, indi-
cating that stereotyping was greater when Black primes were 
more (vs. less) prototypic. The effect of Black prototypical-
ity was unaffected by category salience. The greater stereo-
typing of high prototypic Black primes was associated with 
greater SAC and SAP. This finding replicates prior research 
in finding that Black prototypicality reliably increases acti-
vation (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). In addition, this 
offers support to the idea that categorization is graded, where 
targets that are highly typical of a category lead to quicker 
and stronger categorization than targets low in typicality 
(Medin, 1989; Mur et al., 2012; Rosch, 1973; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975).
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that categorization influences 
stereotyping primarily by changing SAP, rather than activa-
tion. Category salience seemed to have little impact on SAC. 
However, results indicate that SAC is much greater than zero, 
regardless of category salience. In addition, even in low cat-
egory salience conditions, we observe stereotyping. These 
findings are consistent with the perspective that categories are 
activated early and spontaneously in person perception.
Experiment 3
Method
To better understand the relationship between categorization 
and SAC, in our next experiment, we further decreased cat-
egory salience. Given that SAC was equal in the low and 
high category salience conditions in Experiments 1 and 2, it 
seemed plausible that merely seeing the racial category 
change, even in a low salience condition, was sufficient to 
activate stereotypes. There were several occasions through-
out the task in Experiments 1 and 2 in which racial category 
varied. During the practice trials, all participants saw primes 
presented in a mixed context. In addition, all participants saw 
several versions of both the blocked and mixed contexts. As 
such, in the prior experiments, we were unable to examine 
the effect of merely seeing more than one level of prime 
(e.g., varying race) on SAC. In Experiment 3, we manipulate 
category salience between-subjects to ensure that partici-
pants in the blocked context are only ever exposed to condi-
tions of low category salience.
Table 7. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% CIs] by 
Priming Context.
Experiment 2
 Blocked Mixed
SAC 0.72 [.68, .75] 0.74 [.58, .61]
SAP 0.59 [.58, .61] 0.63 [.62, .64]
D 0.11 [.09, .13] 0.12 [.09, .14]
G 0.23 [.22, .25] 0.23 [.21, .24]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; CI = confidence interval; 
SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; D = target 
detection; G = guessing.
Table 8. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% CIs] by 
Prime Set.
Experiment 2
 High set Low set
SAC 0.92 [.88, .95] 0.55 [.51, .95]
SAP 0.67 [.65, .68] 0.52 [.51, .59]
D 0.10 [.08, .13] 0.11 [.09, .13]
G 0.23 [.22, .25] 0.23 [.21, .24]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; CI = confidence interval; 
SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; D = target 
detection; G = guessing.
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Participants. Participants were 364 undergraduates at a uni-
versity in California who participated for partial course 
credit. Our sample size was based on the effect size for the 
prime simple effect for Black versus White primes obtained 
in Experiment 1, within the blocked context, ηp
2 13= . , to be 
powered for at least 85% power. Three participants were 
removed from the analysis for pressing the “less threatening” 
key on every trial. Similar to the previous studies, we con-
ducted a sensitivity analysis to quantify the level of power 
afforded by our final sample of 364 participants with a 
between-subjects design. A sensitivity analysis conducted 
for a two-tailed independent t test at 80% power, α = .05 
indicated that we would be able to detect an effect size of d 
= .280 or larger.
Design. The experiment used a 2 (priming context: blocked 
vs. mixed context) × 3 (prime: Black vs. neutral vs. White) 
× 2 (target: high vs. low threat) mixed design. Although 
priming context manipulated category salience in a concep-
tually similar way to the prior experiments, there were now 
two counterbalanced blocked priming contexts. Specifically, 
participants in the blocked condition were randomly assigned 
to either see Black vs. neutral primes or White vs. neutral 
primes during the first block of the task. In the second block, 
they saw the prime race that was not presented in the first 
block (e.g., if they saw Black vs. Neutral primes in the first 
block, they would see White vs. neutral primes in the second 
block). In this way, participants saw all of the primes but 
presented in a blocked (low salience) context for the entire 
session. In the mixed condition, participants saw Black vs. 
neutral vs. White primes presented randomly throughout all 
blocks of the task. All other factors were manipulated 
within-subjects.
Materials. Stimuli were identical to those used in Experi-
ment 1.
Procedure. The procedure of the SMT was identical to Exper-
iment 1. Priming context was manipulated similarly to 
Experiment 1 but was now implemented as a between-sub-
jects variable. With the simplification of the design, we 
shortened the task to 144 trials. Participants in the blocked 
priming context saw 72 trials of Black and neutral primes (48 
Black, 24 neutral) and 72 trials with White and neutral primes 
(48 White, 24 neutral), counterbalanced. Within each block, 
trials were randomly presented. In the within-subjects prim-
ing context, there were 144 trials of Black, neutral, and White 
primes (48 of each) randomly presented. Participants in all 
conditions were given a break after every 72 trials.
Results
SMT effects. To examine the effect of priming context on ste-
reotyping, we subjected the proportion of more threatening 
responses to a 2 (priming context: blocked vs. mixed) × 
(prime: Black vs. neutral vs. White) × 2 (target threat: high 
vs. low) mixed-ANOVA. There was a target main effect, F(1, 
359) = 128.28, p < .001, ηp
2 263= . , indicating that high 
threat targets were judged as more threatening on a greater 
proportion of trials than low threat targets. In addition, there 
was a prime main effect, F(2, 664.406) = 47.01, p < .001, 
ηp
2 116= . , indicating that Black primes led to a somewhat 
greater proportion of more threatening judgments than White, 
F(1, 360) = 2.42, p = .120, ηp
2 007= . , 95% CIdiff = [–.01, 
.05] and neutral primes, F(1, 360) = 66.16, p < .001, 
ηp
2 155= . , 95% CIdiff = [.11, .18] (see Table 9 for mean 
proportions). White primes also led to a greater proportion of 
more threatening judgments than Neutral primes, F(1, 360) = 
58.28, p < .001, ηp
2 139= . , 95% CIdiff = [.09, .15].
Of primary interest was whether priming context moder-
ated stereotyping, such that there was more stereotyping in 
the mixed relative to the blocked context, which would be 
indicated by a priming context by prime interaction. As 
expected, priming context moderated stereotyping, F(2, 
664.40) = 4.12, p = .019, ηp
2 011= . , such that there was a 
weaker prime effect in the blocked,7 F(2, 416.14) = 30.17, p 
< .001, ηp
2 114= . , than in the mixed context, F(2, 231.79) 
= 21.59, p < .001, ηp
2 149= .  (see Figure 7 for mean propor-
tions). Simple effects analyses on the prime effect for the 
blocked contexts revealed no significant difference in threat 
judgments following Black vs. White primes, F(1, 236) = 
.42, p = .515, ηp
2 002= . , 95% CIdiff = [–.04, .02]. In con-
trast, the mixed context showed standard stereotyping 
effects, such that Black primes led to a greater proportion of 
more threatening judgments than White primes, F(1, 123) = 
9.26, p = .003, ηp
2 070= . , 95% CIdiff [.03, .13].
Table 9. Proportion of Threat Judgments (and Standard Errors) as a Function of Priming Context, Prime, and Target.
Experiment 3
 Blocked Mixed
 Black Neutral White Black Neutral White
High threat 0.44 (0.02) 0.35 (0.02) 0.45 (0.01) 0.50 (0.02) 0.35 (0.03) 0.42 (0.02)
Low threat 0.40 (0.02) 0.24 (0.02) 0.40 (0.01) 0.45 (0.02) 0.23 (0.02) 0.37 (0.02)
Note. Primes listed horizontally in the top row. Prime set listed vertically in column.
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Modeling results. As in previous experiments, we aggregated 
the sums of the “more” and “less threatening” responses 
based on each of the SMT trial types for the two priming 
contexts. These sums were again used to estimate parameter 
estimates and model fits. We estimated a model to examine 
the processes underlying the effects of the priming context 
manipulation. The model fit well, G2(4) = 1.59, p = .811, w 
= .006, suggesting that the model was appropriate to explain 
the data.
First, we compared the blocked and mixed contexts on the 
SAC parameter. Unlike the prior experiments, this revealed a 
significant difference between the two groups, ΔG2(1) = 
6.42, p = .011, w = .011, indicating that SAC estimates were 
higher in the mixed (SAC = .67; 95% CI = [.63, .72]), than 
the blocked context (SAC = .60; 95% CI = [.57, .64]). Next, 
we compared the contexts on the SAP parameter. As in the 
previous experiments, SAP estimates were higher in the 
mixed (SAP = .56; 95% CI = [.55, .57]), than in the blocked 
contexts (SAP = .49, 95% CI = [.48, .50]), ΔG2(1) = 63.72, 
p < .001, w = .035 (see Table 10 for parameter estimates).
Discussion
Experiment 3 extended the general findings of the prior 
experiments. In the mixed (high category salience) condi-
tion, we observed standard levels of stereotyping. In con-
trast, in the blocked (low category salience) priming context 
condition, stereotyping (the Black vs. White prime effect) 
was eliminated. Replicating the prior experiments, the mixed 
priming context showed greater SAP than the between-sub-
jects context. Novel to Experiment 3 was the difference 
between salience conditions in SAC, in which stereotype 
activation was greater in the mixed than blocked condition.
General Discussion
Across all three experiments, we found that category salience 
moderated stereotyping, such that conditions of low category 
salience led to less stereotyping than high salience. Category 
salience was consistently associated with differences in SAP. 
Notably, in Experiments 1 and 2, which manipulated cate-
gory salience fully within-subjects, SAC was equivalent in 
the low and high salience conditions. However, when cate-
gory salience was manipulated between-subjects such that 
participants only saw primes presented in a low category 
salience condition (i.e., primes were always presented in a 
blocked context) or high salience condition, SAC was lower 
than in the low salience context. It seems that when prime 
race is not made salient by context, SAC is indeed lower than 
when categories are salient. When considered in light of the 
prior two experiments, these findings suggest that, once ste-
reotypes have been activated in one context, they remain 
active in other contexts. If categories are made salient, ste-
reotypes may become more accessible and continue to be so, 
even if categories are later made less salient. Thus, it appears 
that, as long as categories are made salient at some point dur-
ing the task (i.e., in a mixed priming context), stereotypes 
may become active and maintain such activation, even carry-
ing over into a low salience context (i.e., in a blocked prim-
ing context).
Theoretically, the findings regarding sensitivity of SAC 
are consistent with prior literature on the relationship 
between categorization and impression formation. For 
example, Brewer and Feinstein’s (1999) dual process model 
of impression formation argues that people are judged based 
on initially salient and meaningful features in the environ-
ment, which can either promote category-based or person-
based processing. Our findings comport with this model in 
that making categories salient at any point during the task 
(leading our participants to potentially take on a “categori-
cal processing mode”) led participants to use categories, 
regardless of whether the environment maintained such 
salience. Other models of person perception such as the con-
tinuum model (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999) and the cate-
gorization and individuation model (Hugenberg, Young, 
Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010) both posit that people should pro-
cess social categories initially in person perception and only 
avoid stereotypes if motivated to do so. Accordingly, our 
findings indicate that people are especially likely to use 
Figure 7. Proportion of threat judgments as a function of 
priming context and prime in Experiment 3.
Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Table 10. SMT Model Parameter Estimates [and 95% CIs] by 
Priming Context.
Experiment 3
 Blocked Mixed
SAC 0.60 [.57, .64] 0.67 [.63, .72]
SAP 0.49 [.48, .50] 0.56 [.54, .57]
D 0.11 [.09, .12] 0.13 [.11, .15]
G 0.27 [.26, .28] 0.25 [.24, .27]
Note. SMT = stereotype misperception task; CI = confidence interval; 
SAC = stereotype activation; SAP = stereotype application; D = target 
detection; G = guessing.
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categories when the environment makes them salient and, 
lacking a motivational reason to process other information, 
categories and stereotypes will continue to be active. As a 
result, stereotypes may carry over between contexts to a 
greater extent than has sometimes been recognized. This 
could contribute to phenomena such as moral licensing 
(Monin & Miller, 2001), in which people who initially 
express disapproval of stereotypes subsequently render 
more stereotypic judgments than people who do not initially 
express such disapproval.
Our findings regarding the context sensitivity of SAP are 
consistent with prior theorizing and also extend such work. 
In particular, it has often been proposed that SAP should be 
easier to intentionally manipulate than SAC (Devine, 1989; 
Fazio et al., 1995). Supporting this idea, we found that the 
extent of SAP depended on category salience. Specifically, 
stereotypes were applied more when categories were salient 
than when they were not. Although SAC also was sensitive 
to category salience in Experiment 3, it was not in 
Experiments 1 and 2 in which the manipulation of salience 
was less clean. This suggests that SAC may be less reactive 
to context than SAP, which, presumably, can be more easily 
intentionally modified. Given these findings, our interpreta-
tion of the relationship between salience and application is 
that salience leads to an increase in the availability of cate-
gorical and stereotypic information. As such, the more salient 
the information is, the more likely it should be to be used. In 
addition, salience may also act as a cue to the relevance of 
categories to judgment, leading people to apply stereotypes 
more or less.
The current work underscores the importance of employ-
ing process modeling to better understand psychological 
phenomena. Previous research used different measures to 
assess SAC and SAP. As a result, any observed differences 
may reflect differences in the nature of the tasks rather than 
differences in activation versus application, per se. 
Multinomial processing tree models such as the SMT allow 
researchers to measure multiple processes from outcomes on 
a single task, thereby removing task variance as a potential 
explanation for observed differences in processing. Using 
the SMT model, we found that SAP is more responsive to 
salience than might have been assumed. In particular, 
salience affected application even when it did not affect acti-
vation. We also observed that the effects of salience on acti-
vation extend across contexts. The precision achieved with 
modeling also allows researchers greater insight into how to 
reduce stereotyping. Specifically, a better understanding of 
the antecedents and consequences of SAC and SAP facili-
tates our ability to design effective interventions to reduce 
both processes.
Although models such as the SMT can provide valuable 
information about how variables such as salience influence 
stereotyping processes, they cannot speak to the temporal 
relationships between them. The model is specified in terms 
of how processes constrain each other, but not in terms of 
temporal order. Thus, although SAC precedes SAP in the 
model tree, it is possible that aspects of SAP begin to unfold 
before the full extent of SAC is determined. But, regardless 
of the temporal relationship between SAC and SAP, the 
extent of SAP is constrained by whether or not SAC has 
occurred. Additional research using techniques capable of 
measuring the time course of processes would be needed to 
understand the temporal relationships among categorization, 
SAC, and SAP.
A limitation of the current research is that only social cat-
egory information was varied and, as such, may have been 
the only information that seemed relevant for participants. It 
is possible that introducing additional individuating informa-
tion about targets might influence the extents of SAC and 
SAP. For example, introducing facial expressions or varying 
the gender of primes might lead to a reduction in activation 
of race stereotypes. Future research should more fully exam-
ine the manner in which categories, stereotypes, and indi-
viduating information influence one another and the extents 
of SAC and SAP.
Appendix
Additional SMT Effect Results
Experiment 1: Prime × context simple effects for neutral 
primes. Within the blocked context, Black primes led to a 
greater proportion of threat judgments than neutral primes, 
F(1, 146) = 39.39, p < .001, ηp
2 21= . . White primes also led 
to a greater proportion of threat judgments than neutral 
primes, F(1, 146) = 7.31, p = .008, ηp
2 05= . . In the mixed 
condition, Black primes led to a greater proportion of threat 
judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 146) = 59.85, p < .001, 
ηp
2 29= . . In addition, White primes led to a greater propor-
tion of threat judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 146) = 
4.20, p = .042, ηp
2 03= . .
Experiment 1: Prime × target effects. There was a prime × 
target interaction, F(2, 274.67) = 11.54, p < .001, ηp
2 073= . . 
Simple effects indicated that this interaction was driven by a 
difference in magnitude in proportion of threat judgments 
given to the high versus low targets such that the difference 
between targets was the greatest following neutral primes, 
F(1, 146) = 35.41, p < .001, ηp
2 195= . , relative to White, 
F(1, 146) = 13.78, p < .001, ηp
2 086= . , and Black primes, 
F(1, 146) = 9.07, p = .003, ηp
2 058= . .
Experiment 2: Neutral prime × priming context × prime 
effects. To determine whether neutral primes impacted the 
effect of priming context on priming effects, we created a 
variable representing whether neutral primes were present or 
absent during blocks of the experiment (present = yes; 
absent = no). To investigate whether neutral primes inter-
acted with priming context, we subjected the proportion of 
“more threatening” judgments to a 2 (presence of neutral 
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primes: yes vs. no) × 2 (priming context order: blocked con-
text first vs. mixed context first) × 2 (priming context: 
blocked vs. mixed context) × 2 (prime: Black vs. White) × 
2 (prime set: low vs. high prototypic Black primes) × 2 (tar-
get: high vs. low threat) mixed-ANOVA. Unlike Experiment 
1, this analysis revealed a three-way interaction between the 
presence of neutrals, priming context, and prime, F(1, 138) 
= 4.65, p = .033, ηp
2 03= . .
To better understand this effect, we examined the 2 (prim-
ing context: blocked vs. mixed context) × 2 (prime: Black vs. 
White) repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
when the neutral primes were and were not present. When 
neutral primes were present, there was an interaction between 
context and prime, F(1, 137) = 10.49, p = .002, ηp
2 07= . . 
When neutral primes were absent, there was also an interac-
tion between context and prime, F(1, 137) = 26.31, p < .001, 
ηp
2 16= . . Overall, the interaction suggests that priming con-
text effects were somewhat stronger in the condition without 
neutral primes. Importantly, however, context still moderated 
the prime effect even when neutrals were present. As such, we 
felt that it was reasonable to analyze and report the results of 
trials where neutral primes were present in the main text.
Experiment 2: Prime × context simple effects for neutral 
primes. Within the blocked context, simple effects revealed 
that Black primes led to a greater proportion of threat judg-
ments than neutral primes, F(1, 138) = 89.84, p < .001, 
ηp
2 39= . . White primes also led to a greater proportion of 
threat judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 138) = 20.51, p < 
.001, ηp
2 13= . . Within the mixed context, simple effects 
showed that Black primes led to a greater proportion of threat 
judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 138) = 107.20, p < 
.001, ηp
2 44= . . White primes also led to a greater proportion 
of threat judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 138) = 12.08, 
p = .001, ηp
2 08= . .
Experiment 2: Prime × target effects. Similar to experiment 1, 
there was a prime × target interaction, F(2, 226.47) = 8.73, 
p < .001, ηp
2 060= . . Simple effects indicated that this inter-
action was driven by a difference in magnitude in proportion 
of threat judgments given to the high vs. low targets such 
that the difference between targets was the greatest follow-
ing neutral, F(1, 138) = 53.88, p < .001, ηp
2 281= . , relative 
to Black, F(1, 138) = 13.68, p < .001, ηp
2 090= . , and White 
primes, F(1, 138) = 13.45, p < .001, ηp
2 089= . .
Experiment 2: Additional modeling results. There was no effect 
of priming context on the D parameter, ΔG2(1) = .06, p = 
.813. Similarly, there was no effect of priming context on the 
G parameter, ΔG2(1) = .24, p = .621.
Experiment 3: Block order effect analysis. Unexpectedly, within 
the blocked context the effect of priming context differed 
depending on whether White or Black primes were presented 
first, F(2, 416.14) = 3.90, p = .025, ηp
2 016= . . When Black 
primes were presented first there was a prime main effect, 
F(2, 209.48) = 24.21, p < .001, ηp
2 18= . . Simple effects 
analyses revealed that in this context, Black primes led to a 
lower proportion of more threatening judgments than White 
primes, F(1, 114) = 5.98, p = .016, ηp
2 050= . , but Black 
primes led to a greater proportion of more threatening judg-
ments than neutral primes, F(1, 114) = 16.14, p < .001, 
ηp
2 124= . . White primes also led to a greater proportion of 
more threatening judgments than neutral primes, F(1, 114) = 
54.59, p < .001, ηp
2 324= . .
When White primes were presented first, there was also a 
prime main effect, F(2, 191.83) = 10.77, p < .001, ηp
2 08= . , 
however, in this case, Black primes led to a marginally 
greater proportion of more threat judgments relative to White 
primes, F(1, 121) = 3.40, p = .068, ηp
2 027= . , and signifi-
cantly more than neutral primes, F(1, 121) = 16.84, p < 
.001, ηp
2 122= . . White primes also led to more threat judg-
ments than neutral primes, F(1, 121) = 7.93, p = .006, 
ηp
2 062= . .
Experiment 3: Prime × target effect. Just as in Experiments 1 
and 2, there was a prime × target interaction, F(2, 656.25) = 
25.72, p < .001, ηp
2 067= . . Simple effects indicated that 
this interaction was driven by a difference in magnitude in 
proportion of threat judgments given to the high vs. low tar-
gets such that the difference between targets was the greatest 
following, Neutral F(1, 360) = 125.25, p < .001, ηp 258
2 = . , 
relative to Black, F(1, 360) = 26.04, p < .001, ηp
2 067= . , and 
White primes, F(1, 360) = 42.15, p < .001, ηp
2 105= . .
Experiment 3: Additional modeling results. There was no effect 
of priming context on the D parameter ΔG2(1) = 1.82, p = 
.178. There was a marginal effect of priming context on the 
G parameter, ΔG2(1) = 3.82, p = .051, suggesting that par-
ticipants guessed “more threat” more often in the blocked, 
than in the mixed priming context.
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Notes
1. In Experiment 1A, n = 37. In Experiment 1B, n = 113. 
Experiments 1A and 1B were identical in design and results. 
For ease, we report the results of both experiments together. 
Experiment 1B was a preregistered replication of Experiment 
1A. This experiment and the others reported in the article 
were posted on Open Science Framework (Open Science 
Collaboration; available at: osf.io/c9kqw).
2. Given that we were conceptually replicating a manipulation used 
in Macrae and Cloutier (2009), we were concerned about poten-
tial differences between the two studies. In particular, whereas 
Macrae and Cloutier (2009) only used two prime types (male vs. 
female), the SMT uses three (Black vs. neutral vs. White). To 
test whether the inclusion of neutral primes influenced the prim-
ing context effect, we only included neutral primes on half of all 
trial types. In the blocked context, there were 40 trials of White 
and Black primes presented alone, and another set of 40 Black 
and White primes that were presented with 20 neutral primes. 
Within the mixed context, there were 80 Black and White prime 
trials, and another set of trials with 120 Black, neutral, and 
White primes presented. See Figure 1 for a visual representation 
of all block types.
3. Analyses reported in the main body of the article are conducted 
only on trials presented with neutral primes. The SMT model 
requires neutral primes to estimate model parameters and, as 
such, reporting the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for 
the data that were modeled ensures that the stereotyping and 
modeling results are based on the same data. For clarity, in 
the main body of the article, we only report the prime simple 
effects of interest: The comparison between Black and White 
primes. Full decomposition of the prime simple effects involv-
ing neutral primes for all experiments can be found in the 
appendix.In Experiments 1 and 2, we conducted analyses that 
examined the effect of neutral primes on the priming context 
effect. In Experiment 1, neutral primes did not moderate the 
effect of priming context on stereotyping. In Experiment 2, neu-
tral primes somewhat attenuated but did not eliminate the effect 
of priming context. Details for all analyses related to neutral 
primes are reported in the appendix.
4. In addition to the SMT, we also ran several analyses examin-
ing model fit for alternative models. First, we tested a model 
in which detection of the target trait comes first and stereo-
type activation (SAC) follows the failure of target detection 
(d-SMT). We also tested a process dissociation plus guessing 
model (PDg). This model is identical to the standard PD model 
in that control (C) comes first and, at the failure of C, associa-
tion activation (A) may drive behavior. In the absence of A, 
responses will be driven by a response bias (G) to select either 
more or less threat. As Table 2 indicates, across all three experi-
ments and for all three model fit indices, the SMT had the least 
misfit (i.e., best model fit) of the three models. Thus, we focus 
our discussion of the modeling results for all three experiments 
on the SMT.
5. Because the G and D parameters are not consistently impacted 
by the priming context manipulation and cannot account for the 
pattern of results observed in the stereotyping data, we report all 
subsequent results for these parameters in the appendix.
6. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections applied for violations of sphe-
ricity on the prime variable.
7. Within the blocked context, there was an unexpected effect of 
prime race order, F(2, 416.14) = 3.90, p = .025, ηp
2 016= . . We 
did not anticipate that the blocked contexts would differ based 
on which prime race was presented first and, as such, we report 
the full decomposition of this effect in the appendix.
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